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Abstract: The paper emerges from the failure of the traditional models of hyperinflation with 
rational expectations or perfect foresight. Using the insights from two standard optimizing 
monetary settings the paper shows that the possibility of perfect foresight monetary 
hyperinflation paths depends robustly on the essentiality of money. We show that the popular 
semilogarithmic form of the demand for money is not appropriate to analyse monetary 
hyperinflation with perfect foresight. We propose a simple test of money essentiality for the 
appropriate specification of the demand for money equation in empirical studies of 
hyperinflation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper emerges from the well known failure of the traditional monetary models of 
hyperinflation. Since the ‘surprising monetarist arithmetic’ analysed in Buiter (1987) it is 
known that under rational expectations or perfect foresight this class of models is 
fundamentally flawed because it is not able to generate the process it is designed to 
characterize - monetary hyperinflation1 that is a speeding up inflation unstable dynamic 
process driven by monetary growth with real cash balances tending to vanish. This traditional 
class of models, such as Evans and Yarrow (1981) or Bruno and Fischer (1990), relies on the 
famous Cagan (1956) money demand and considers the monetization of a large fiscal deficit 
as the driving force of hyperinflation. 
 
These models are so influential in the literature that small variations of them can be found in 
the major books on macroeconomics or monetary economics, such as Walsh (2003) for 
instance. Moreover most of the large empirical literature on hyperinflation (Petrovic and 
Mladenovic (2000), Slavova (2003) or Georgoutsos and Kouretas (2004) among others) relies 
on these traditional models with the Cagan money demand and rational expectations.  The 
failure of this class of influential models with rational expectations or perfect foresight may 
                                               
1
 This paper is not about speculative hyperinflations which are the focus of other works such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), 
Barbosa and Cunha (2003), or Arce (2009) for instance. Speculative hyperinflations, as defined by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1983), are explosive price-level paths unrelated to monetary growth. 
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cast doubt on part of the vast hyperinflation empirical studies. Although hyperinflationary 
episodes are rare they regularly generate a significant amount of empirical studies. The recent 
Zimbabwean experience, as the second most extreme hyperinflation in monetary history after 
Hungary in 1946 (see, for example, Hanke and Kwok (2009) and Pilossof (2009)), will surely 
stimulate interesting new empirical studies. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper 
aims at understanding the failure of Cagan based inflationary finance models with perfect 
foresight. Second, it aims at providing empirical studies of hyperinflation with a test for the 
appropriate specification of the demand for money equation. 
 
Traditional monetary models of hyperinflation based on Cagan (1956) imply the possibility of 
dual equilibria and the existence of an inflation tax Laffer curve. All models which generate 
the high inflation trap defined by Bruno and Fischer (1990) fail to produce monetary 
hyperinflation2. Evans and Yarrow (1981) and Bernholz and Gersbach (1992) already pointed 
out that the crucial condition for generating hyperinflation is that real money balances should 
not decrease more than inflation increases with high rates of inflation. This problem has given 
rise to a significant amount of new literature and some new specifications of this class of 
models have emerged. These new specifications can be mainly separated in two different 
approaches depending on the kind of feature included in the basic inflationary finance model 
to guarantee the former crucial condition. 
 
The first approach includes in the models a mechanism of sluggish adjustment of some 
nominal variable like expected inflation, money holdings or the exchange rate. Sufficiently 
slow adaptive expectations, as in Evans and Yarrow (1981) or Bruno and Fischer (1990), 
learning as in Marcet and Nicolini (2003) or Adam et al (2006), a crawling peg rule for the 
exchange rate as in Bruno (1989), or a sufficiently slow adaptive adjustment on the money 
market as in Kiguel (1989) can restore the correct running of this class of models. However, 
even if one can find arguments in favour of the use of adaptive expectations during 
hyperinflationary episodes, as Bruno and Fischer (1990) do for instance, it is hard to justify 
the persistent presence of behaviours involving either systematic forecast mistakes or 
maladjustments resulting in prohibitive costs for the agents in a hyperinflationary context. 
The second approach maintains perfect foresight assuming that agents respond most likely 
instantaneously to changes in inflation during hyperinflation but abandons the Cagan money 
demand function. Ashworth and Evans (1998) look for empirical support for other functional 
forms than the Cagan money demand. Vazquez (1998), Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) or 
Barbosa et al (2006) develop inflationary finance monetary optimizing models to obtain a 
demand for real cash balances compatible with explosive hyperinflation and perfect foresight. 
This paper follows this second approach. 
 
We consider two standard continuous time and non-stochastic optimizing monetary settings 
representing alternative ways of modelling the transaction role of money: a money-in-the-
utility-function model (henceforth called MIUF model) and a cash-in-advance model 
(henceforth called CIA model). We build on Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) but consider the 
two monetary optimizing setups with general household’s preferences which is something 
new. The aim is to examine the possibility of monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight 
using the insights from these two monetary optimizing settings. Using the insights from a 
monetary optimizing model to address one specific issue concerning hyperinflation dynamics 
may be a useful approach as shown by Arce (2009)3 for instance. We work with two different 
                                               
2
 See Evans (1995) or Vazquez (1998) for a survey of this literature. 
3
 Arce (2009) focuses on the explanation of the hysteresis in the stock of real cash balances after the end of 
hyperinflations using a cash-and-credit model. 
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monetary settings to look for robustness of the results. We show that in both settings 
monetary hyperinflation can arise consistently with perfect foresight under a similar condition 
stating that the households should consider the money sufficiently essential to the system. In 
this respect the paper contributes to the understanding of the well known Cagan inflationary 
finance models failure with perfect foresight and provides a test for the specifications of the 
demand for money equation designed for empirical studies of monetary hyperinflation. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 considers a version of a MIUF 
economy with a general specification of the representative agent’s preferences. It provides a 
general characterization of agents’ preferences compatible with perfect foresight monetary 
hyperinflation equilibria relying on the essentiality of the money. Section 3 studies a version 
of a CIA model with a general specification of the representative agent’s preferences and 
shows again the dependence of perfect foresight monetary hyperinflation paths on a sufficient 
level of money essentiality. Section 4 relates money essentiality to money demand inelasticity 
and provides specific theoretical support to the double-log functional form of the money 
demand during hyperinflation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. MIUF economy, hyperinflation and money essentiality 
 
We extend the basic setup of Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) first, by considering general 
utility functions and, second, by taking into account the goods market equilibrium condition. 
The optimizing monetary model is a continuous time model (assumption [A1]) where the 
economy consists of a large number of identical infinitely-lived forward looking households 
endowed with perfect foresight (assumption [A2]). Population is constant and its size is 
normalized to unity for convenience (assumption [A3]). There is no uncertainty (assumption 
[A4]). Each household has a non-produced endowment 0ty >  of the non-storable 
consumption good per unit of time (assumption [A5]). 
 
In the MIUF model the role of money as a medium of exchange is assumed to be captured by 
introducing real money balances into the household utility function. Our MIUF framework 
considers households preferences represented by a general class of utility functions 
(assumption [A6]). Therefore, the representative household utility at time 0 is 
 
( )
0
,
rt
t tU c m e dt
∞
−
 .    (1) 
 
The instantaneous utility function has standard properties (assumption [A7]): it is continuous, 
twice differentiable on 2+ , increasing and strictly concave in tc , the household’s 
consumption at time t, and tt
t
M
m
P
=  his holdings of real monetary balances (M is the nominal 
stock of money, P is the price level). The rate r is the subjective discount rate which is 
assumed to be equal to the real rate of interest (assumption [A8]). Households can hold 
money and bonds paying a nominal interest ti  (assumption [A9]). Real per capita financial 
wealth and the nominal interest rate are defined as 
 
t t tw m b= + , 
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t ti r pi= + , 
 
respectively, where tb denotes real per capita government debt, tpi is the inflation rate. The 
household allocates its resources between consumption, gross accumulation of real money 
balances and bonds. The household’s budget constraint is 
 
( )t t t t t tw y rw c i mτ= − + − + ,    (2) 
 
where tτ is a lump-sum tax assumed to be constant. The household’s optimization problem 
leads to the following first-order condition: 
 
( )
( )
,
,
m t t
t
c t t
U c m
r
U c m
pi
′
+ =
′
,    (3) 
 
where ( ),c t tU c m′  is constant with respect to time because the instantaneous rate of time 
preference is equal to the real rate of interest. Condition (3) requires that at each moment the 
nominal rate of interest be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for 
money. It implicitly defines a demand for money as a function of the nominal interest rate i. 
The optimum solution is completed by the transversality condition: 
 
( )lim , 0rt c t t tt e U c m w−→∞ ′ =  .     (4) 
 
The setup is completed by considering the equilibrium condition in the goods market. 
Following Barbosa et al (2006) or Vazquez (1998, p. 438) “in the spirit of the traditional 
approach to the study of hyperinflationary phenomena, we assume that output and 
government expenditures are constant”. Therefore, the market for goods is in equilibrium 
when constant supply of good y equals household consumption and constant per capita 
government expenditures (g): 
 
ty c g= + .     (5) 
 
In usual inflationary finance models a constant per capita government’s budget deficit, d, is 
financed by issuing high-powered money (assumption [A10]): 
 
t
t t t
t
Md m m
P
pi= = +

 .    (6) 
 
Substituting the value of pi  extracted from first-order equation (3) in the latter expression 
leads to the inflationary finance model dynamics described by the following law of motion for 
real cash balances: 
 
( )
( )
,
,
m t t
t t
c t t
U c m
m d r m
U c m
 ′
= − − 	 	′
 
 .   (7) 
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Differential equation (7) provides a complete characterization of real per-capita money 
balances dynamics which will be studied by using the technique of phase diagram on[ [0; +∞ . 
The main interesting point here is to examine whether this law of motion for real cash 
balances is able to produce hyperinflation paths. An explosive hyperinflation path will be 
observed if the law of motion presents a path leading to a zero level of real cash balances. 
Therefore, the conditions for this kind of paths should be identified. As the mathematical 
function representing the law of motion is continuous (which is true with standard 
assumptions on U) this kind of paths will be observed as long as (dropping index time for 
convenience): 
 
0
lim 0
m
m
+→
< .     (8) 
 
The calculation of lim
m
m
→+∞

 will assess the existence of any steady state. Nevertheless, 
whatever the number of steady states, since we focus on possible explosive hyperinflation 
paths we are only interested in the paths starting at the left of the first possible steady state 
when the condition 
0
lim 0
m
m
+→
<   is met. 
 
According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) in the context of speculative hyperinflations issue, 
any path leading to a zero value of real cash balances and crossing eventually the vertical axis 
at some finite point should be ruled out on grounds that such paths would not be feasible 
because the real stock of money would eventually become negative. However, we would 
rather follow the point made by Barbosa and Cunha (2003, p. 192) who contested the 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) approach by arguing that on such hyperinflationary paths “when 
the real quantity of money reaches zero hyperinflation would have wiped out the value of 
money, the opportunity cost of holding money would have become infinite”, and “the 
economy would no longer be a monetary economy”. Therefore, we follow the point made by 
Barbosa and Cunha (2003) and consider the explosive hyperinflation paths corresponding to 
the condition 
0
lim 0
m
m
+→
<  as perfect foresight competitive equilibrium paths. 
 
Moreover, it’s important to stress that the possible explosive hyperinflationary paths are 
explosive monetary hyperinflations because along these paths the rate of growth of the money 
supply explodes. Rewriting government budget constraint as 
 
M d
M m
=

, 
  
we see that along the paths of continuously declining m, given that 0,d > the growth rate of 
money supply increases continuously. 
 
In this respect, according to the law of motion (7), the possibility of explosive hyperinflation 
will depend on the condition 
 
( )
( )0
,
lim
,
m
m
c
U c m
m d
U c m+→
 ′
> 
′  
.     (9) 
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The latter condition is basically a condition about a sufficient level of the essentiality of 
money along a hyperinflationary path. Scheinkman (1980) considered money as essential in a 
hyperinflation context if the inflation tax collected by the government does not tend to zero 
when the rate of inflation explodes. The interpretation of such a condition is that “no matter 
how expensive it becomes to hold money people still hold a large quantity of it; that is money 
is very necessary to the system” (Scheinkman, 1980, p. 96)4. From (6) we see that seigniorage 
obtained by printing money can be decomposed into two components, the change in the real 
stock of money and the inflation tax mpi  which can be written, according to equation (3): 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
, ,
, ,
m m
c c
U c m U c m
m r m m rm
U c m U c m
pi
 ′ ′
= − = − 	 	′ ′
 
. 
 
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes we consider 
 
[ ] ( )( )0 0
,
lim lim
,
m
m m
c
U c m
m m
U c m
pi
+ +→ →
 ′
=  
′  
. 
 
Therefore, when ( )( )0
,
lim 0
,
m
m
c
U c m
m
U c m+→
 ′
> 
′  
 then [ ]
0
lim 0
m
mpi
+→
>  and money is essential. These 
findings enable to formulate a first proposition. 
 
 
Proposition 1: In a MIUF economy, characterized by the set of assumptions [A1] to [A10], 
explosive monetary hyperinflations are possible only if money is sufficiently essential that is 
if ( )( )0
,
lim
,
m
m
c
U c m
m d
U c m+→
 ′
> 
′  
. 
 
Proof: The proof relies on the previous arguments and can be illustrated by the phase diagram 
depicted on Figure 1. The precise shape of the phase diagram depends on the first and second 
derivative of m  with respect to m. Other shapes than that depicted on Figure 1 could be 
possible for the phase locus. However, as the important point for the analysis conducted here 
insists on the condition for
0
lim 0
m
m
+→
< , our analysis focuses only on the paths leading to a zero 
value of real cash balances. If lim 0
m
m
→+∞
> , the locus m  will cross the horizontal axis at least 
once. We consider here a unique unstable steady state *m but the qualitative analysis for 
explosive hyperinflationary paths doesn’t change in the case of more steady states. All paths 
originating at the right of m* are hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out because 
violating the transversality condition (4). All paths starting to the left of m* are explosive 
hyperinflations paths. 
 
Using a similar MIUF framework with a particular constant-relative-risk-aversion utility 
function Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) point out that explosive hyperinflationary dynamics 
are more likely when the transaction role of money becomes important. Our results confirm 
and extend to more generality the point made by Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) by relating the 
                                               
4
 This definition of the essentiality of money is also used  in Sturzenegger (1994) or Barbosa and Cunha (2003) 
for example in the context of speculative hyperinflationary paths. 
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possibility of monetary explosive hyperinflations to a sufficient level of money essentiality in 
the model. 
 
Figure 1. 
Monetary dynamics in a MIUF economy with money sufficiently essential 
 
 
 
Explosive hyperinflation paths starting at the left of m* are equilibrium paths since they are 
consistent with equilibrium condition on the goods market (5). Along these paths of declining 
real cash balances real per capita consumption will remain constant at tc y g= −  but 
households will suffer from an increasing loss of welfare representing the harmful effect of 
hyperinflation on the economy. 
 
Considering the particular case where the utility function is additively separable in 
consumption and real cash balances: 
 
( ), ( ) ( )t t t tU c m u c v m= + , 
 
where the functions u and v are continuous, twice differentiable on 2+ , increasing in their 
respective argument,  and strictly concave [assumption A7’], the condition (9) of Proposition 
1 resumes to 
 
[ ]
0
lim ( ) ( )
m
mv m du c
+→
′ ′> .    (10)  
 
In the latter condition the value of ( )u c′ is constant with respect to time and can be replaced 
by ( )u y g′ −  using the goods market equilibrium condition (5). Scheinkman (1980) related 
the condition 
0
lim ( ) 0
m
mv m
+→
′ >  to the essentiality of money. The condition (10), as a particular 
case of Proposition 1, states that the possibility of explosive hyperinflation depends on a 
sufficient level of money essentiality which is conveyed by the utility function for money 
services. 
 
m  
 
m 
0 
*
m  
( )
( )0lim
,
,
m
m
c
d
U c m
m
U c m→ +
−
′
′
 
 
 
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According to Proposition 1, the failure of the Cagan inflationary finance model to produce 
explosive hyperinflations with perfect foresight is not surprising. The Cagan ad-hoc model 
relying on the Cagan money demand can be considered as a special case of the MIUF model 
developed here. Since Kingston (1982), it is known that the semi-log schedule is ‘integrable’. 
In the terms of the latter it means that the schedule ‘can be generated by at least one 
optimizing framework’. The ‘integrability’ of Cagan money demand was shown again later by 
Calvo and Leiderman (1992). 
 
 
Proposition 2: In a MIUF economy, characterized by the set of assumptions [A1] to [A6], 
[A7’], and [A8] to [A10], the ‘integrable’ Cagan money demand with perfect foresight does 
not comply with money essentiality. 
 
Proof: The ‘integrability’ of Cagan money demand is shown by using a utility function for 
money services v(m) such as : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 log for all 0 rv m u y g r m m m eγ αα γ α− +′= − + + − < < . 
 
The latter utility function for money services will deliver through the first-order equation (3) 
the famous semi-logarithmic Cagan money demand ( log m γ αpi= − , with γ  a constant and 
α  a positive constant). The current MIUF model will resume in the inflationary finance 
Cagan model. However, such a utility function for money services doesn’t comply with 
money essentiality requirement since for the latter utility function
0
lim ( ) 0
m
mv m
+→
′ = . Then, it 
won’t allow the modelling of monetary hyperinflation as stated in Proposition 1. 
 
 
3. CIA economy, hyperinflation and money essentiality 
 
We adopt the basic setup of section 2 keeping all assumptions from [A1] to [A5] and from 
[A8] to [A10]. It differs, however, from it in two aspects. First, assumption [A6] is replaced 
by assumption [A6b] stating that representative household’s preferences are represented by a 
general class of utility function depending only on the level of real consumption. 
Accordingly, the household utility at time 0 is 
 
0
( )rt te U c dt
∞
−
 .     (11) 
 
The function U belongs to a general class of utility function increasing and strictly concave in 
its single argument, real good consumption: assumption [A7] is replaced by assumption 
[A7b]. Second, in a CIA economy the role of money as a medium of exchange is captured by 
a cash-in-advance constraint assuming that money holding is strictly essential to buy the 
consumption good (assumption [A7c]). In order to consume c units of the consumption good 
at time t, the household must hold a stock of real cash balances, m, greater or equal to c: 
 
t tm c≥ . 
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In this non-stochastic environment assuming that the nominal interest rate i is greater than 
zero, meaning that money is return-dominated by government bond, it follows that CIA 
constraint must hold with equality: 
 
t tm c= .      (12) 
 
The representative household optimization problem consisting of maximizing (11) subject to 
the constraints given by (2) and (12) leads to the following first order condition: 
 
( )( ) 1t tU m iλ′ = + .    (13) 
 
The associated Lagrange multiplier λ  is constant with respect to time because the agent’s rate 
of time preference equals the real rate of interest, and real cash balances will indirectly enter 
the utility function according to (12). Equation (13) characterizes a demand for real money 
balances decreasing with respect to the rate of inflation (or the cost of holding cash balances) 
because the utility function U is strictly concave. The transversality condition implies that 
 
lim 0rt tt e wλ
−
→∞
= .     (14) 
 
By using the definition of the nominal interest rate, the first order condition (13) can be 
written as follows: 
 
( )( ) 1t
t
U m rλ
pi λ
′ − +
= .     (15) 
 
As in usual inflationary finance models a constant per capita government’s budget deficit, d, 
is financed by issuing high-powered money, the law of motion for real money balances in this 
CIA inflationary finance model will be given by combining (6) and (15), leading to 
 
( )( )1 ( ) 1t t tm d U m r mλλ ′= − − + .    (16) 
 
On the basis of the methodology and the argumentation developed in section 2, the possibility 
of explosive hyperinflation paths depends on condition (8) leading to the following condition 
for the CIA economy (dropping the time index for convenience) 
 
[ ]
0
lim ( )
m
mU m dλ
+→
′ > .    (17) 
 
In the same way as in section 2 in the framework of a MIUF economy, condition (17) relates 
the possibility of explosive hyperinflation to a sufficient level of money essentiality. 
Moreover, this sufficient level of money essentiality is conveyed by the agent’s preferences. 
According to (15), inflation tax is given by 
 
( )( ) 1U m r
m m
λ
pi λ
′ − +
=  	

 
. 
 
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes we consider 
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[ ] [ ]
0 0
1lim lim ( )
m m
m mU mpi λ+ +→ →
′= . 
 
From the mathematical point of view it appears that condition (17) allowing the model to 
generate possible explosive hyperinflations paths is exactly of the same kind as condition (9) 
in the MIUF model. Condition (17) is particularly similar to condition (10) in the MIUF case 
with an additive separable utility function. 
 
 
Proposition 3: In a CIA economy, characterized by the set of assumptions [A1] to [A5], 
[A6b], [A7b], [A7c], and [A8] to [A10], explosive hyperinflations are possible only if money 
is sufficiently essential that is if [ ]
0
lim ( )
m
mU m dλ
+→
′ > . 
 
Proof: The proof relies on previous arguments. 
 
The possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths is again a discussion about a sufficient level 
of money essentiality. The CIA model presents exactly the same kind of limitations as the 
MIUF model for characterizing explosive hyperinflation paths with perfect foresight. The 
CIA constraint doesn’t convey by itself sufficient money essentiality even if it makes money 
necessary for the transactions. 
 
 
Proposition 4: According to proposition 3, in a CIA economy, characterized by the set of 
assumptions [A1] to [A5], [A6b], [A7b], [A7c], and [A8] to [A10], the ‘integrable’ Cagan 
money demand with perfect foresight does not comply with money essentiality. 
 
Proof: The ‘integrability’ of the Cagan money demand in the CIA setup is shown by using 
the following household’s utility function: 
 
( ) ( )11 11 log , for all rU c r c c c eγ αγλ
α α
+ ++ 
= + + − < 	

 
. 
 
The latter household’s utility function will deliver through the first-order equation (13) the 
famous semi-logarithmic Cagan money demand ( log m γ αpi= − , with γ  a constant and α  a 
positive constant). The current CIA model will resume in the inflationary finance Cagan 
model. However, such a utility function doesn’t comply with the money essentiality 
requirement since for the latter utility function
0
lim ( ) 0
m
mU m
+→
′ = . Then, it won’t allow the 
modelling of monetary hyperinflation as stated in Proposition 3. 
 
According to the CIA constraint (12), household real consumption will fall along explosive 
hyperinflation paths characterized by the declining value of real money balances. The fall of 
households’ real consumption will cause an increasing loss of welfare and represent the 
harmful effect of hyperinflation on the CIA economy. There is some evidence supporting this 
result. As pointed out by Vazquez (1998), Webb (1989) in his Table 5.4 shows evidence that 
consumption fell dramatically during German hyperinflation. The recent collapse of the 
Zimbabwean economy illustrates the same point. 
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4. Money essentiality, money demand inelasticity and monetary hyperinflation 
 
Money essentiality is closely related to the inelasticity of the demand for money with respect 
to the cost of holding cash balances. We define the function ( )f m measuring the cost of 
money services according to 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
,
 in the MIUF economy
,
( )  
 in the CIA economy
m
c
U c m
m
U c m
f m mi m r
U m
m
pi
λ
λ
′
⋅
′
= = + = 
′ −
⋅ 	

 
. 
 
 
Proposition 5: According to propositions 1 and 3, any differentiable money demand function 
inelastic with respect to the cost of holding cash balances is consistent with money 
essentiality. Moreover, if it complies with 
0
lim ( )
m
f m d
+→
>  then it will allow the modelling of 
monetary hyperinflation under perfect foresight. 
 
Proof:  
The first derivative of ( )f m is 
1( ) 1 1m if m i i
i m ε
 ∂ 
′ = + = − 	 	  	∂
  
 
. 
 
where ε  represents the elasticity of the money demand with respect to the nominal interest 
rate. If the money demand is interest-rate inelastic, 1ε < , then ( ) 0f m′ < . 
  
Since ( ) 0f m ≥  and ( ) 0f m′ <  when the money demand is inelastic, it follows 
that ( )
0
lim 0
m
f m
+→
> . Then, we have  
 
( )
( )
( )
0
0
0
,
lim >0 in the MIUF economy
,lim ( )
1 lim >0 in the CIA economy
m
m
c
m
m
U c m
m
U c mf m
mU mλ
+
+
+
→
→
→
′
⋅
′
= 

′
, 
 
implying that when money demand is interest rate-inelastic then money is essential. 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 complete the proof. 
 
Barbosa et al (2006), in a similar framework, point out the role of the inelasticity of money 
demand functions with respect to the nominal interest rate for the possibility of explosive 
inflation path but insist in the need of an increasing government deficit. Our results stress, 
rather, the role of money essentiality and are established with a constant government deficit 
without needing an increasing deficit. 
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Proposition 5 establishes that inelastic money demand function complying with a sufficient 
level of money essentiality can be candidates for replacing the famous Cagan money demand 
function to model successfully monetary hyperinflation under perfect foresight. Among them 
the double-log schedule with perfect foresight may be distinguished: 
 
log log , 0 1m δ β pi β= − < < , 
 
with δ  constant. This money demand functional form exhibits a constant elasticity lower than 
one with respect to the inflation rate. 
 
 
Proposition 6: According to propositions 1 and 3, the ‘integrable’ double-log schedule with 
0 1β< <  is an appropriate candidate functional form to replace the Cagan money demand 
function in the analysis of monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight. 
 
Proof: As shown by Kingston (1982), the double-log schedule is ‘integrable’ in a MIUF 
setup. Using the setup of a MIUF economy with additive-separable utility function for 
instance, one can easily verify that using a utility function for money services v(m) such as 
 
( )
11
( )
1
e
v m rm m u y g
δ
β
ββ
β
−
 
 	
′= + ⋅ − 	
− 	

 
, 
 
will give microeconomic foundations to the double-log schedule. The money demand 
function described by the double-log schedule complies with Proposition 1 as shown by the 
following calculation: 
 
( )0
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m
mv m d
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′
= +∞ >
′ −
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The double-log schedule is also ‘integrable’ in the CIA setup of section 3. Using a utility 
function such as 
 
( ) ( )
11
1
1
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δ
β ββλ λ β
−
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−
, 
 
will also give microeconomic foundations to the double-log schedule complying with 
Proposition 3 since for the latter we have: 
 
( )
0
lim
m
mU m dλ
+→
′ = +∞ > . 
 
Figure 2 represents the monetary dynamics derived from the double-log schedule under 
perfect foresight. All paths starting at the left of the unique unstable steady state *m  are 
monetary hyperinflations. The paths starting at the right of the unique steady state can be 
ruled out because violating the transversality condition (4) for the MIUF setup or (14) for the 
CIA setup. 
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Figure 2. 
Monetary dynamics with the double-log schedule 
 
 
 
Proposition 6 provides theoretical support for the use of the double-log schedule for money 
demand in the modelling of explosive hyperinflation under perfect foresight. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The insights from the two monetary optimizing settings, the MIUF and the CIA setups, 
considered in this paper have been useful to show that the possibility of perfect-foresight 
explosive monetary hyperinflation paths requires the households to consider the money as 
sufficiently essential to the system. It is shown that, whether in the MIUF or in the CIA 
framework, the appropriate level of money essentiality is conveyed by the representative 
agent’s preferences and does not depend on the specific way, CIA or MIUF, of modelling the 
role of money as a medium of exchange. Therefore the paper establishes a quite robust 
theoretical link between the possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths and the essentiality 
of money5. The importance of the issue of the essentiality of money has been already raised in 
the literature of speculative hyperinflations as in Barbosa and Cunha (2003). It is confirmed in 
this paper in the monetary model of hyperinflation with perfect foresight. Further research 
may be conducted to better assess the robustness of this result to alternative ways of 
modelling the transaction role of money as search-theoretic approaches for instance. 
Moreover, as the attention has been restricted to perfect-foresight equilibria, further research 
could be also conducted to deal with rational expectations equilibria in a stochastic 
environment. 
 
                                               
5
 The requirement of sufficient essentiality of money is relevant for hyperinflationary paths analyse beyond technical 
arguments. As pointed out by Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004), money becomes more essential for purchasing goods during 
hyperinflation than during stable periods “because extreme inflation dramatically decreases credit transactions and in general 
the use of long term contracts”. Moreover, a sufficient level of money essentiality is crucial in inflationary finance models of 
hyperinflation since the government needs the money to be essential to the system in order to get sufficient inflation tax when 
inflation explodes. 
m  
 
m 
0 
*
m
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The result of the theoretical link between the possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths and 
the essentiality of money leads to two contributions to the monetary analysis of 
hyperinflation. First, it contributes to the understanding of the well known failure of Cagan 
inflationary finance models with perfect foresight. The semi-log schedule of the famous 
Cagan money demand with perfect foresight is shown not to comply with money essentiality 
neither in the MIUF setup nor in the CIA one. This analysis may cast doubt on hyperinflation 
empirical studies that have adopted the monetary model of hyperinflation with the Cagan 
money demand and rational expectations. Second, it provides a test of the sufficient 
essentiality of money for the appropriate specification of the demand for money for the 
empirical studies of hyperinflation. A similar test of the money essentiality for empirical 
studies has been also suggested in Barbosa and Cunha (2003) to address the issue of the 
exclusion of speculative hyperinflation paths. This paper confirms the importance of such a 
test for the choice of appropriate functional forms of the demand for money in empirical 
studies of hyperinflation. 
 
A particular class of inflation inelastic money demand functions has been shown to be 
appropriate candidates to replace the popular semilogarithmic functional form in the analysis 
of explosive hyperinflation in inflationary finance models. The paper provides a particular and 
robust theoretical justification to the double-log schedule with perfect foresight. Ashworth 
and Evans (1998) provided an empirical support to functional forms in which the absolute 
inflation elasticity is a decreasing function of inflation and particularly to the inflation 
inelastic double-log or log-linear schedule. Therefore, this paper may be complementary to 
Ashworth and Evans (1998) by giving the theoretical support to the log-linear specification of 
the demand for money in the analysis of explosive hyperinflation. Further research may be 
conducted for the choice of alternative appropriate forms of the demand for real cash balances 
in hyperinflation contexts for which microeconomic foundations should comply with the 
money essentiality requirement. The recent Zimbabwean experience may give rise to 
interesting empirical studies of hyperinflation using in particular the log-linear form for the 
specification of the demand for money. 
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